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Abstract
While there is a growing philosophical interest in analysing olfactory experiences, the
mereological structure of odours considered in respect of how they are perceptually
experienced has not yet been extensively investigated. The paper argues that odours
are perceptually experienced as having a mereological structure, but this structure is
significantly different from the spatial mereological structure of visually experienced
objects. Most importantly, in the case of the olfactory part-structure, the classical weak
supplementation principle is not satisfied. This thesis is justified by referring to empir-
ical results in olfactory science concerning the human ability to identify components
in complex olfactory stimuli. Further, it is shown how differences between olfactory
and visual mereologies may arise from the way in which these modalities represent
space.
Keywords Perception · Olfaction · Mereology · Vision · Perceptual organization ·
Ontology · Perceptual content · Perceptual representations
In this paper I argue that olfactory experiences present odours as having a mereologi-
cal structure. However, the proposed olfactory part-structure is significantly different
from spatial part-structure presented in visual experiences of objects. In particular, in
the case of olfactory mereology, the weak supplementation principle, which entails
that entities cannot have only one proper part, is not satisfied. This is an important dif-
ference, as the weak supplementation principle is an essential component of classical
mereological systems.
Currently, many philosophers of perception express scepticism towards a “visuo-
centric” approach, according to which all perceptual experiences are organised by
the same rules and categories as visual experiences (see Kubovy and von Valkenburg
2001; O’Callaghan 2012). This scepticism has led to an increase in investigations
B Błaz˙ej Skrzypulec
blazej.skrzypulec@gmail.com
1 Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy ´Swiat
72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland
123
Synthese
concerning non-visual perceptual experiences, including olfactory ones. The rela-
tively small (but growing) philosophical literature on olfaction is primarily concerned
with three questions. The first of these questions is whether olfactory experiences can
be considered representations (see Richardson 2013). According to a standard repre-
sentationalist position (e.g., Batty 2009, 2010a; Cavedon-Taylor 2018; Young 2016),
human olfactory perception can be analysed in terms of mental states having content
which represents, accurately or not, some elements of the environment. In this paper, I
adopt this general representationalist approach to olfaction (see Barwich 2014; Cooke
and Myin 2011; Keller 2016, pp. 108–109 for criticism). From this perspective, I
discuss the way in which olfaction presents odours as having parts.
A second question, which already assumes a representational account of olfaction,
concerns the nature of the external entities that are represented in olfactory experiences
(see Budek and Farkas 2014; Cavedon-Taylor 2018). Usually, it is claimed that external
objects of olfaction are either odours or entities that are sources or odours (like an
onion in case of an onion-odour, see Batty 2010a; Cavedon-Taylor 2018; Roberts
2015). In subsequent sections, I assume that human olfaction, at least in a majority of
cases, represents odours. However, I do not investigate what odours exactly are (e.g.,
chemical mixtures or structures, see Carvalho 2014; Lycan 2014), and I do not analyse
the mereology of such external entities.
A third question, which I address here, concerns not what the external entities of
olfaction are, but how these entities are presented in olfactory experiences. In the case
of investigations concerning mereology, this question concerns whether odours are
presented as having parts, and not whether external, physical odours have a mereo-
logical structure. In this context, it has been debated whether olfactory experiences
present odours as objects. According to a popular position within the philosophy of
perception, entities are experienced as objects when they are experienced as (a) indi-
viduals instantiating properties (Cohen 2004; Matthen 2004; O’Callaghan 2008), (b)
entities that persist through time and change (Pylyshyn 2007; Scholl 2007), and (c)
mereological wholes (O’Callaghan 2016; Stevenson 2014). Relying on these charac-
teristics, philosophers have discussed whether odours are experienced as persisting
through time (Millar 2017; see also Young 2016) and if there are phenomena, such
as figure/ground discrimination, which suggest that odours are presented as individ-
uals having properties (Batty 2010a, b; Stevenson and Wilson 2007; Keller 2016,
pp. 71–77; Mendolovici forthcoming).
Nevertheless, odour’s part-structure, as presented in olfactory experiences, has not
yet been extensively investigated (with notable exceptions, such as Mizrahi 2014;
Young 2016; O’Callaghan 2016, discussed in Sect. 2). This is an important omis-
sion, as mereological relations play a crucial role in organising visual experiences,
so showing that the mereology of olfaction is significantly different to visual spatial
mereology constitutes an argument against the “visuocentric” approach to human per-
ceptual modalities. Apart from the question of “visuocentrism”, investigation of the
olfactorily experienced part-structure is philosophically interesting because one of the
main tasks of the philosophy of perception is to formulate a theory of experiential
content (see Bayne 2009; Siegel 2006). Such a theory would not be complete without
considering the mereological relations that play a significant role in organising the
contents of experiences related to various modalities.
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Furthermore, analysis of olfactory mereology is relevant to investigations of struc-
tural features of perceptual experiences. It is recognised that the phenomenal character
of experiences is determined not only by the presented entities but also by the way in
which a given modality presents those entities (see Soteriou 2013, pp. 111–115). For
instance, while both vision and touch may present the same entities, visual and tactile
experiences are phenomenally distinct due to the fact that visual and tactile spaces
are organised according to differing structural principles (see Martin 1992; Matthen
2004; Richardson 2011). Similarly, mereological considerations can show how vari-
ous modalities structure experiences by using parthood relations. This may allow to
determine which mereological principles are common for all modalities and which
are modally-specific.
The question of whether odours are presented as having parts is related, but not
equal, to the more general question of whether odours are presented as objects. In
particular, showing that odours are experienced as having mereological structure cor-
roborates, but does not prove, the hypothesis that odours are experienced as objects.
On the other hand, showing that olfaction presents odours as partless entities suggests
that odours are not experienced as objects in the standard sense used by philoso-
phers of perception. Furthermore, arguments for and against the theses that odours
are experienced as individuals possessing properties and as persisting entities do not
automatically have significance for the question of olfactory mereology. Because of
this independence, I intend to only discuss those arguments concerning the object-
status of perceptually presented odours that have direct implications for the question
of mereological structure (see Sect. 2). In addition, while I argue that odours are pre-
sented as having proper parts, my arguments do not assume that odours are presented
as objects, and they do not entail this conclusion (it is still possible that odours are
presented as mereologically complex properties).
The paper starts by introducing the basic, classical mereological principles, and
showing that they are satisfied in the case of visually experienced objects (Sect. 1).
Subsequently, I argue, relying on empirical research in olfactory science, that while
odours are perceptually presented as having mereological structure (Sect. 2), the weak
supplementation principle is probably not satisfied in the case of this structure (Sect. 3).
In the final paragraphs, I propose that mereological differences between vision and
olfaction are grounded in the way in which these modalities represent space.
1 Mereology and vision
In contemporary ontology, mereological theories are formal theories that specify prin-
ciples satisfied by the parthood relation. Virtually all such theories assume three basic
principles that jointly constitute the “ground mereology” (Casati and Varzi 1999,
p. 36):
(Reflexivity) For every x, x is a part of itself.
(Antisymmetry) For every x and y, if x is a part of y, then y is not a part of x
unless x is identical to y.
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(Transitivity) For every x, y and z, if x is a part of y and y is a part of z, then
x is a part of z.
In addition, by using the notions of parthood and identity, a useful notion of a proper
part is defined:
(Proper Part) For every x and y, x is a proper part of y if and only if x is a part
of y but x is not identical to y.
Furthermore, the ground mereology is usually extended by adding the weak supple-
mentation principle (Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 39):
(Weak Supplementation Principle) For every x and y, if x is a proper part of y,
then there is z such that z is a part of y and z does not have any common part
with x.
The weak supplementation principle entails that an entity cannot have only one proper
part. This is because, according to this principle, if an entity y has a proper part x, then
it also has a part z that does not share parts with x. As a result, the entity z cannot be
identical to x as they do not share any parts. Furthermore, z cannot be identical to y as
it would then have a common part with x: x itself. In consequence, z is a proper part
of y that is different from x, so y has at least two proper parts. This constraint is, in
fact, very intuitive if one considers figures presented in visual experiences. In the case
of such figures their proper parts are spatial fragments that are smaller than the whole
figure. In consequence, if a fragment of a figure is its proper part, then the remaining
fragment of this figure is a second, complementary proper part. For instance, an edge
may be considered a proper part of a square. However, it is not the only proper part
of a square, as the remaining edges, together with the square’s interior, constitute a
complementary proper part.
The ground mereology extended by the weak supplementation principle constitutes
the “minimal mereology”. Such minimal mereology is included within all standard
mereological theories, and only counterexamples found in mereological textbooks
concern very specific conceptions, like Brentano’s mereological notion of soul (Casati
and Varzi 1999, p. 39). Nevertheless, I will argue that, while the weak supplementation
principle is satisfied in the case of the visually presented spatial part-structure of
objects, there is an olfactorily presented mereology of odours in case of which the
considered principle is not true.1 In this sense, the analyzed olfactory mereology is
deeply non-classical.
In order to demonstrate that vision presents spatial the part-structure of objects in
a way that satisfies minimal mereology, let’s consider how we visually experience
objects. According to a dominant psychological view, a spatial fragment of the envi-
ronment is visually experienced as an object if it is visually distinguished from the
1 Throughout the paper, by the “visual mereology” I mean spatial part-structure, as it is a visual mereology
that has been primarily investigated by vision scientists. However, I do not assume that it is the only possible
type of visual mereology (e.g. see Skrzypulec (2018) for remarks concerning temporal visual mereology).
Theses defended in this paper may not be justified if non-spatial visual mereologies are concerned. Also,
in the case of olfaction, the reasoning presented in the paper is consistent with a hypothesis that more than
one type of olfactory mereology may exist.
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ground by virtue of possessing properties that differentiate it from the surrounding
(Kubovy and von Valkenburg 2001; Palmer and Rock 1994; Scholl 2001). This usu-
ally happens as a result of representing such a fragment as having edges designating
a change in properties, for instance where one colour ends and another starts (Craft
et al. 2007; Qiu and von der Heydt 2005).2 According to this idea, paradigmatic three-
dimensional material objects, two-dimensional figures, as well as “immaterial” entities
like holes, shadows, or reflections are, at least in usual conditions, visually experienced
as objects. Nevertheless, despite the wide scope of the above psychological concept,
not every fragment of the environment can be visually experienced as an object. Let’s
consider a case in which one perceives a uniformly white sheet of paper. This sheet has
many spatial fragments, which cannot be visually experienced as objects, since they
do not have any borders separating them from neighbouring regions. For instance, in
the centre of a sheet there is a circular fragment and a star-shape fragment (and in fact
many more fragments of various shapes), but before they are somehow differentiated
from the surrounding, for example by drawing their edges with a pencil, human vision
cannot distinguish them from the uniformly white ground.
Objects can be, and usually are, visually experienced as having parts. Analogously,
such parts are those of their spatial fragments, that are themselves visually distin-
guished by possessing properties, like colour or shape, that allow differentiation from
other spatial fragments of an object, or from the whole object itself. Again, according to
psychological models of part perception (Hoffman and Richards 1984; Xu and Singh
2002), distinguishing parts occur when some fragments have edges separating them
from the rest of an object, or at least when their edges create a point of convexity, like in
an hour-glass shape, which indicates a place where a part ends. Thus parts of visually-
experienced objects are themselves experienced as objects in the sense provided by
the broad notion of perceptual objecthood presented earlier, because according to this
minimal notion, virtually every spatial fragment visually distinguished by virtue of
some discontinuities can be classified as an object of some sort. Nevertheless, not all
fragments of objects are visually experienced as their parts and therefore as objects.
For instance, let’s consider a simple square figure with a white interior separated from
the surroundings by a black outline. It has visual parts corresponding to four edges,
as each of the edges has a different colour from the surrounding, and is separated
from neighbouring edges by points of convexity at the square’s vertices. However,
not all fragments of such a square can be visually experienced as its parts. The white
interior has many fragments, for example a circular fragment around the centre of the
square, which lacks properties that would allow it to be visually discriminated from
the ground.
Relying on the psychological characterisation of how we visually experience objects
and their parts, it is easy to recognise that the visually presented part-structure of
objects satisfies minimal mereology. Let’s consider an example, which can be eas-
ily generalised, of an object that is visually experienced as rectangular, positioned
horizontally, and composed of two spatially connected squares (see Fig. 1). Parthood
relations organising the structure of this figure are antisymmetric. For instance, the
2 Borderline cases may be situations in which edges that allow to differentiate an object are the boundaries
of the visual field itself. For instance, one may postulate that when standing close to a uniformly blue wall,
the wall is visually experienced as a single object encompassing the whole visual field.
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Fig. 1 A rectangle composed of two squares which are visually experienced as its spatial proper parts
right square is a visual part of the whole rectangle, but not conversely, as the square is
visually smaller than the whole figure, and so cannot be experienced as containing the
whole rectangle. Furthermore, parthood relations are transitive. For example, because
the right square is a visual part of the whole rectangle and the rightmost edge of the
rectangle is a visual part of the right square, the rightmost edge is also a visual part
of the rectangle. This is because all fragments of the right square are visually expe-
rienced as being contained within the whole rectangular figure. In addition, parthood
is reflexive, as the whole rectangle is its own maximal fragment, which is differen-
tiated both from the surrounding and from its other parts, for instance from the left
and right squares. Finally, the weak supplementation principle is also satisfied. One
cannot visually divide the considered figure in such a way that it would have only one
proper part. A proper part, like the right square, would always be supplemented by
the rest of the figure, for instance by the left square, which would constitute a second,
complementary proper part.
It should be noted that while the weak supplementation principle excludes enti-
ties that have only one proper part, it allows for the existence of atomic entities with
no proper parts. For instance, it may be claimed that an experience associated with
perceiving a uniformly coloured surface from a close distance presents an object as
having some spatial extension, but not as having proper parts. Such a surface is not
visually represented as having qualitative discontinuities which, according to psycho-
logical models, seem to be crucial for part-perception. On the other hand (see Dretske
1969, pp. 24–25 for a classic source of this intuition), one may postulate that even
such a uniform object can be visually divided into proper parts by merely focusing
attention on its various spatial fragments. In the paper, I do not aim to resolve the above
issue, as both options are consistent with the satisfaction of the weak supplementation
principle. However, later I note that while it is controversial to state that objects can
be visually experienced as atomic, it is plausible that there are odours which are not
perceived as having any proper parts.
The above considerations show that it is very plausible to postulate that the visually
presented spatial mereology of objects satisfies the principles of minimal mereology.
In subsequent sections, I argue that while odours are experienced as having proper
parts, their mereology is non-classical as it does not satisfy the weak supplementation
principle.
2 Olfactory parts
Considerations regarding olfactory mereology should start by asking whether olfac-
tory experiences present odours as having parts. More precisely, they should start by
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considering whether odours are experienced as having proper parts, as it is trivial
that every entity has a single improper part. As stated in the introduction, while there
is growing discussion regarding whether odours are represented as objects, there is
limited work explicitly concerning the mereology of olfactory experiences. The argu-
ments in favour of the thesis that odours are experienced as having proper parts have
been presented by Young (2016) and O’Callaghan (2016), while Mizrahi (2014) has
argued that such mereological structure is not perceptually attributed to odours.
Young postulates that odours are experienced as having parts because olfactory
experiences present us with (a) “entities that persist through their temporal changes in
features” and (b) “their combination and mixture with other olfactory objects” (Young
2016, p. 523). He states that “[w]hen attention is paid to this aspect of our olfactory
experience it becomes apparent that these are objective experiences of mereologically
complex entities” (Young 2016, p. 523). Nevertheless, I believe that such reasons
are not sufficient to justify the claim that odours are experienced as having proper
parts. First, the ability to persist and having a mereological structure are independent
characteristics and so persistence is compatible with lack of part-structure. There is
nothing inconsistent with mereologically atomic entities that nevertheless may stay
numerically the same despite changes concerning their properties (see Keinänen and
Hakkarainen 2010).
Furthermore, the mere fact that perception presents some entities as combining or
mixing with each other does not justify the claim that these entities, or an entity result-
ing from mixing, are experienced as having proper parts. This is because there are
perceptual modes of combinations that produce a partless entity from several differ-
ent, also partless entities. For instance, human olfactory perception may be synthetic,
analogously to human colour perception. In the case of colour perception, a com-
bination of redness and yellowness is not visually experienced as a complex colour
with red and yellow proper parts, but as a new, partless orange colour. If odours are
perceptually combined in a synthetic way they may mix with each other and produce
new odours without being experienced as having any proper parts.
O’Callaghan (2016, p. 1281) proposes a different argument in favour of experiential
olfactory parts which relies on the way in which space is olfactorily presented (see also
Aasen 2018; Roberts 2015). He claims that diachronic olfactory experiences, involving
exploratory behaviours such a moving within the area where odorants are encountered,
present odours as extended in space. This is thought to justify the claim that odours
are presented as having some spatial parts. However, having spatial extension is not
a sufficient condition for having proper parts. First, from a formal perspective there
is nothing inconsistent about characterising an entity as being spatial extended while
denying that it has any proper parts (in metaphysical debates, such entities are known as
extended simples, see McDaniel 2007). Second, as shown in section one, psychological
models of part perception do not assume that every spatial fragment of an entity
presented in an experience is experienced as one of its parts (Hoffman and Richards
1984; Xu and Singh 2002). Instead, it is claimed that perceptually recognised parts
are those fragments that are distinguished in virtue of representing an appropriate
arrangement of qualitative discontinuities. In consequence, the psychological notion
of perceptual parts does not support the claim that entities experienced as occupying
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more than one location have to be experienced as having parts located at these different
places.
Differently to Young and O’Callaghan, Mizrahi (2014, pp. 247–248) claims that
olfactory experiences do not present odours as having parts. First, it seems that olfac-
tory experiences represent space in a rudimentary fashion that does not allow us to
distinguish between various potential spatial parts of an odour. Second, human olfac-
tory perception lacks exploratory behaviours that in the case of vision are associated
with part-perception, like changing the viewpoint from which an object is observed in
order to recognise its structure. Third, odours presented in olfactory experiences seem
to lack the edges and qualitative borders that make it possible to distinguish parts in
the case of visually experienced objects. I believe that these are important arguments
for the thesis that odours are not experienced as having spatial proper parts analogous
to the parts presented in visual experiences. However, it would be too quick to assume
that spatial parthood is the only variant of perceptual parthood. Below, I claim that
there is a more general, not necessarily spatial, notion of perceptual parthood and
it is justified to postulate that odours are experienced as having parts satisfying this
notion.3
In the previous section, it was argued that in the case of visual perception, visually
experienced parts of objects are those of their fragments that are themselves visually
distinguished as objects—by virtue of properties that allow them to be differentiated
from other fragments of an object, or from the whole object itself. While in the case of
vision such parts are spatial parts, this does not have to be the case for all modalities. In
particular, in philosophical works regarding audition, it is often stated that sounds are
experienced not as having spatial parts but as possessing temporal parts (e.g., Matthen
2010; O’Callaghan 2008). Such temporal parts are temporal fragments of complex
sounds that are perceptually distinguished as separate sounds by detecting qualita-
tive differences, in particular those concerning changes in pitch (O’Callaghan 2008).
Despite the fact that auditory experiences present non-spatial parts, these parts satisfy
the same general characteristic that was applied to spatial, visual parts. According to
this characteristic, auditorily experienced parts of sounds are those of their fragments
that are themselves auditorily distinguished as sounds by virtue of properties that
allow them to be differentiated from other fragments of a sound, or from the whole
sound itself. Generalizing from these examples concerning particular modalities, we
may state that perceptually experienced parts of Xs are those of their fragments that
are themselves perceptually distinguished as Xs by virtue of properties that allow
them to be differentiated from other fragments of an X, or from the whole X itself.
When this general notion is applied in the case of olfaction, the following rule will be
obtained: olfactorily experienced parts of odours are those of their fragments that are
themselves olfactorily distinguished as odours by virtue of properties that allow them
to be differentiated from other fragments of an odour, or from the whole odour itself.
The presence of olfactory parts satisfying the above notion can be demonstrated
by considering in a more detailed way the synthetic and analytic aspects of olfactory
3 Similarly, as in the case of visual mereology, I do not provide an argument that olfactory mereology
described in this paper is the only one that can be formulated. However, I believe that the proposed approach
to olfactory part-structure is one of the most plausible, as it is closely connected both with phenomenal
intuitions and empirical data concerning olfactory perception.
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perception. Within the olfactory science, there is a wide consensus that human olfac-
tory perception has both synthetic and analytic aspects. In fact, this is one of the most
commonly cited observations in the literature concerning olfaction.4 Odour perception
is partially synthetic, because complex odours are not experienced as mere combina-
tions of simpler odours. When several simple odours are perceived simultaneously,
some of their experienced properties may be suppressed, reinforced, and modified; and
entirely new properties may also appear. As a result, a new odour is experienced that
is not identical to a combination of the simple odours. However, unlike experiences
of colours, experiences of complex odours are not entirely synthetic, as in many cases
some simpler odours are still distinguishable within a complex odour. For instance,
within a complex perfume one may distinguish some components, like a cherry note
and a woody note, but the perfume is not experienced simply as a combination of the
distinguished components.
A similar point is also made in terms of “configural” and “elemental” mixtures
of odorants. Elemental mixtures are those that are experienced as a sum of their
components. In contrast, configural mixtures are presented in olfactory experiences as
having novel qualities such that they are not experienced as merely combinations of
some simpler olfactory elements. The elemental and configural character of mixtures is
determined, inter alia, by the chemical structures of odorants, their disposition to evoke
similar or dissimilar experiences, and their concentrations within a mixture (Young
2015). Nevertheless, the distinction between configural and elemental mixtures is not
rigid (see Jinks and Laing 2001). In particular, it is often the case that in a mixture some
components can be distinguished (which is characteristic of elemental mixtures), while
such a mixture has properties that cannot be attributed to any of these components
(which is characteristic of configural mixtures). Furthermore, the configural/elemental
status of a mixture can be modified by a behavioural strategy applied by a subject
(Barkat et al. 2012).
It should be noted that experiences presenting an odour as having a component
are different from those presenting merely two distinct odours. It is often claimed
that human olfaction is able to simultaneously present more than one odour (Batty
2010a; Gottfried 2010; Young 2016; however, see Stevenson and Mahmut (2013) for
an opposite view). For instance, using Batty’s example (Batty 2010a), an air freshener
odour may be co-experienced with a cigarette odour. However, the presence of two
odours in a single experience does not entail that one of the odours is a component
of the other one. An intuitive necessary, but probably not sufficient, condition for
being a component is that a component of an odour O qualitatively constitutes O. It
means that if a component of O ceases to be experienced, then, ceteris paribus, O
will be experienced as having different intrinsic qualities. For example, in the case
of a perfume experienced as having a cherry component, such a perfume will not
be experienced as having the same qualities after the cherry component is no longer
olfactorily presented, since then the perfume would lack its intrinsic cherry qualities.
On the other hand, it seems less obvious that in the example involving cigarette and air
4 See Barwich (2014), Batty (2014), Cooke and Myin (2011), Coureaud et al. (2014), Gottfried (2010),
Howard and Gottfried (2014), Laing and Glemarec (1992), Laing and Jinks (2001), Lawless (1997), Liv-
ermore and Laing (1998), Morton (2000), Stevenson (2014), Thomas-Danugin et al. (2014), Wilson and
Stevenson (2003), Wilson and Sullivan (2011) Witrout et al. (2003).
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freshener odours, the disappearance of one odour would modify experienced intrinsic
qualities of the remaining one.
Below, I do not try to provide a complete set of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions determining whether experienced odours stand in relation to being a component,
because this paper focuses on properties characterising the relation between an odour
and its components, and not conditions under which this relation occurs. Accord-
ing to scientific considerations, a proper answer would have to accommodate data
showing that congruency relations between odours and past experiences, in which
certain odours were systematically correlated, influence whether simultaneously pre-
sented odours are experienced as standing in the relation of being a component (see
Batty 2014; Stevenson and Wilson 2007). Nevertheless, while not providing a theory
explaining the occurrences of being a component relation, in further sections I refer to
experimental designs which, according to olfactory scientists (e.g. Frank et al. 2010;
Laing and Jinks 2001), are suitable for testing the perception of olfactory components.
I believe that olfactorily distinguished components of complex odours are their
proper parts, because they satisfy the general psychological characterisation of per-
ceptual parts described earlier. In an analogy to visual and auditory perception—in
the olfactory context—olfactorily experienced parts of odours are those of their frag-
ments that are themselves olfactorily distinguished as odours, by virtue of properties
that allow them to be differentiated from other fragments of an odour, or from the
whole complex odour itself. It should be noted that the above formulation is neutral
in respect of whether odours are represented as objects. It is simply stated that expe-
rienced components of odours are presented as belonging to the same category, i.e.
odours, without specifying whether exemplars of this category are objects or not.
Components distinguished within complex odours, like the cherry note of a
perfume, are themselves experienced as odours, because they have properties charac-
teristic of odours like a certain intensity, hedonic properties, and qualitative properties
such as sweetness or sourness (Castro and Seeley 2014; Laska et al. 1997; Morton
2000). In addition, they are also perceptually categorised as exemplars of odour cat-
egories, for instance as a cherry odour or a flowery odour (Batty 2014; Wilson and
Stevenson 2003).
Furthermore, such olfactory components are also experienced as fragments of
odours, and not simply as their properties. Despite the fact that they are not in any
clear sense presented as spatial or temporal fragments of a whole complex odour, they
have the same formal characteristic which differentiates spatial fragments of visually
experienced objects, and temporal fragments of auditorily experienced sounds, from
visual and auditory properties. This characteristic is lack of existential dependence in
relation to a whole; entities which are experienced as fragments of a whole can also
be experienced separately.
In the case of vision, one cannot usually experience properties such as colours
without experiencing them as characterising some objects or places. On the other hand,
a visually-experienced spatial fragment of a complex object, like a square constituting
a rectangular figure, can be experienced separately, without being a constituent of any
more complex object. In this sense, a spatial fragment is existentially independent
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from a whole.5 Analogously in the auditory domain, properties such as loudness are
not presented without characterising some sound. However, a temporal fragment of a
complex sound, like a melody fragment, can be experienced, even if it is not presented
as a part of a more complex whole.
The situation is no different in the case of olfactory experiences. Olfactory proper-
ties such as sweetness are always presented as properties of some odour. Nevertheless,
olfactory components of complex odours, which are themselves identified as odours
and as exemplars of odour-categories—such as the cherry odour within a perfume—-
can be experienced separately. In fact, experimental research in olfactory science often
relies on this lack of dependence. For instance, a common experimental procedure is
that first participants learn to recognise some simple odours presented separately, and
are then asked to recognise the same odours in complex mixtures (e.g., Laing and
Jinks 2001, see next section for a discussion of such studies).6
Finally, the considered olfactory components are also distinguished in virtue of
properties that differentiate them from other fragments, or from the complex odour
itself. For instance, our example cherry component can be distinguished within a
complex perfume because it is sweeter or less musky than the whole complex odour.
Of course, olfactory parts are not exactly the same as visual parts. In particular,
olfactory parts do not seem to be spatial parts. First, they are not distinguished as
fragments of complex odours in virtue of being experienced as localised within a
sub-region of a location in which a whole odour is located. Second, they are not
distinguished as a result of perceiving spatial borders separating them from other
components of a complex odour. Despite the lack of spatial characteristics specific to
visual parts, olfactorily distinguished components of complex odours satisfy the crucial
elements of the psychological characteristics of perceptual parts: they themselves are
experienced as odours, they are experienced as fragments of complex odours, and they
are distinguished in virtue of having different properties to other components, or to
the whole complex odour itself.7
3 Olfaction andminimal mereology
The experienced part-structure of odours satisfies minimal mereology if and only if (1)
the parthood relation is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive (i.e., the ground mereology
is satisfied), and (2) the weak supplementation principle is fulfilled. I believe that there
are no good reasons to deny that (1) is satisfied in the case of olfactory mereology. The
parthood relation is reflexive because odours presented in olfactory experiences are
identical to their own maximal fragments. Furthermore, it is intuitive that olfactory
parthood is antisymmetric, because while components like the cherry note of a perfume
5 It is not to deny that sometimes experienced properties, in particular colour, change when an entity starts
to be perceived as a part of a larger whole.
6 Again, I do not refute a possibility that sometimes the same odour can be experienced as having different
properties when presented in a mixture (e.g. it may seem sweeter in a mixture).
7 Within this paper, I do not make any claims whether, in the case of visual experiences, one can also identify
some sort of component-based mereology in addition to spatial mereology. In general, it seems possible
that experiences related to a single modality can present more than one type of mereological structure.
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are distinguished within a complex odour, it is not the case that a whole complex odour
can be also distinguished within one of its components. For instance, if a complex odour
is experienced as having a cherry component, then there is something cherry-like
experienced within this complex odour, but probably the whole qualitative character
of the complex odour cannot be distinguished in its cherry component. The transitivity
of olfactory parthood is difficult to test, because it is not clear whether odours can be
presented as having a two-stage structure in which a proper part of a complex odour
O1 is itself a complex odour O2 with its own olfactory proper parts. However, it is
plausible to assume that in such a case the proper parts of O2 would be experienced
as fragments of both O2 and O1.
Nevertheless, there are serious reasons to doubt whether the olfactory part-structure
satisfies the weak supplementation principle. As mentioned, human olfactory percep-
tion has both synthetic and analytic aspects (or, in other words, complex mixtures are
often experienced as having both elemental and configural characteristics). Typically,
complex odours are not experienced as combinations of simple components constitut-
ing them, but as novel odours irreducible to their components (Barwich 2014; Morton
2000; Wilson and Stevenson 2003). Nevertheless, one can often perceptually dis-
tinguish some of the components within a complex olfactory odour (Laing and Jinks
2001; Livermore and Laing 1998; Witrout et al. 2003). Such results come from studies
in which participants are presented with chemical mixtures composed of substances
that are experienced as unified, partless odours (Laing and Jinks 2001; Jinks and Laing
1999, 2001; Laing and Francis 1989; Livermore and Laing 1998). The task of partici-
pants is to state which simple odours she or he can recognise within a complex odour.
The simple odours used in experiments are easy to recognise and have well-known lin-
guistic labels (e.g., lavender or cut grass). Furthermore, before the proper experiment,
training sessions are conducted in which participants learn the simple odours that may
be constituents of a complex stimulus. It should be noted that while the studies to
which I refer are not the newest ones, they are by no means outdated. In particular,
results obtained by Laing and colleagues are commonly cited in recent psychological
and philosophical works on olfaction as classical sources describing well-established
perceptual phenomena (see Barwich 2014; Keller 2011; Stevenson and Attuquayefio
2013; Stevenson and Wilson 2007; Thomas-Danugin et al. 2014; Young 2015 for just
a few of many examples).
The common result of such experiments is that people have a rather limited capacity
for distinguishing the components of olfactory mixtures, as usually no more than four
simple components can be identified within a complex odour (Jinks and Laing 1999;
Laing and Francis 1989; Laing and Jinks 2001; Livermore and Laing 1998). In fact,
even in the case of stimuli composed of only two or three substances, participants are
often unable to distinguish all constituting odours (Livermore and Laing 1998, p. 656).
These results occur despite the long period of stimuli presentation, which suggests
that the limitations do not arise simply because a person does not have enough time
to attentively investigate the structure of the experienced odour (for instance, 50 s in
Livermore and Laing 1998).
Most important in the context of this paper is that in some situations, participants
identify only one component within a complex odour. While this is not the most
common result, it happens in about five to ten per cent of trials, is consistently reported
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across many studies using various substances, and appears no matter whether the
stimulus is relatively simple (e.g., two or three components) or complex (e.g., six
components) (Frank et al. 2010; Laing and Francis 1989, p. 812; Laing and Glemarec
1992, p. 1052; Livermore and Laing 1998, p. 656).
The above result can be interpreted in three ways with differing mereological impli-
cations:
(I) When a participant reports that the experienced odour O has only one compo-
nent C, she or he has an experience presenting only a simple odour, identical to
component C, and not a complex odour. If this is the case, then the recognised
component C is not experienced as a proper part of an odour O but as identical to
O.
For example, one may be presented with a mixture composed of lemon, lavender, and
honey odours and report only the presence of lavender component. If the reason for
this report is that lavender is all a person feels, then such an experience is adequately
grasped by the interpretation (I).
(II) When a participant reports that the experienced odour O has only one component
C, in fact two components are recognised: C and the O-minus-C i.e. the rest of
odour O without component C. According to this interpretation, a participant
divides an odour into two proper parts: C and O-minus-C.
Let’s again consider a case in which a person reports merely the presence of the
lavender component when presented with a lemon-lavender-honey mixture. According
to the interpretation (II), a person distinguishes a lavender component and a second
honey-lemon component (which in fact may be quite phenomenally different from both
honey and lemon). This second component is not reported because it is not recognised
as one of the odours which should be reported according to the instructions given to
participants, or because a person does not have the conceptual resources that would
allow him/her to name this component.
(III) When a participant reports that the experienced odour O has only one component
C, it is literally the case that within an odour O, only one component C is
distinguished, and C is not experienced as identical to the whole O. If this
interpretation is the right one, then component C is experienced as the only
proper part of O, so the considered situation constitutes a counterexample to the
weak supplementation principle.
In the case of experiencing only lavender in lemon-lavender-honey mixture, it would
mean that one experiences an odour O as constituted by a lavender odour. However,
O is not experienced as identical to lavender because it has some properties that are
not properties of a lavender odour (e.g. sweetness). Despite that a person is unable
to distinguish additional odours constituting O, consequently lavender is the only
experienced component.
Below, I argue that it is plausible that at least some cases of distinguishing only
one component C within an odour O are correctly characterised by the interpretation
(III), and so the weak supplementation principle is false in the case of the structure of
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olfactory experiences.8 The proper interpretation should be consistent with the main
empirical observation about the synthetic and analytical character of human olfaction,
i.e. that complex odours are often experienced as having a structure containing simple
components, but they are experienced as something more than just a combination of
these components (see Howard and Gottfried 2014; Stevenson 2014; Thomas-Danugin
et al. 2014 and other works listed in Sect. 2). This constraint can be expressed by the
following principle:
(Analytic-Synthetic Principle) Complex olfactory stimuli are commonly expe-
rienced as containing some simple components (analytic aspects) but not
experienced as identical to the combination of these components (synthetic
aspect).
According to interpretation (I), when a person distinguishes only one simple com-
ponent C within an odour O, then O is experienced as a partless odour identical to
C. This interpretation may be the right one in the case of some simple mixtures, for
instance a mixture composed of two substances, when one substance may so strongly
dominate the experience that the second is not consciously perceived at all. In fact,
it is well-recognised that such phenomena, known as overshadowing, occur in case
of olfactory modality (see Kay et al. 2005). The presence of overshadowing provides
strong reason to believe that there are cases in which odours are experienced as atomic
entities not having any proper parts, while it is less obvious that the same can be stated
about visually experienced objects.9
However, the interpretation (I) is unlikely when more complex stimuli are consid-
ered, given the analytic–synthetic principle. In the case of such stimuli interpretation
(I) entails a radical analyticity because complex stimuli are experienced as identical
to a single distinguished component. Such a way of experiencing complex olfactory
mixtures is implausible, because olfactory experiences of complex stimuli commonly
have significant synthetic aspects, and present odours that are not identical to a com-
bination of their components (Barwich 2014; Morton 2000; Wilson and Stevenson
2003).
If interpretation (I) is rejected, then the single distinguished component C is expe-
rienced as a proper part of odour O. However, according to interpretation (II) it is
not the only proper part of O. This interpretation states that when a component C is
distinguished, then the rest of odour O, i.e., odour O minus component C, is distin-
guished as a second proper part of O. Plausibly, this is a proper interpretation in the
case of visual mereology, because when an object is visually experienced as having a
proper part, the remaining fragment of this object serves as a complementary proper
part. However, it seems intuitively less plausible in the case of olfaction. For instance,
when I distinguish a cherry note and a woody note within a perfume, it does not
seem that I also distinguish an additional component that is the perfume minus these
two notes. Furthermore, this intuition has a theoretical justification coming from the
8 This is not to deny that it can be satisfied in the majority of olfactory experiences. What I claim is that it
is not satisfied as a general rule characterising the olfactory part-structure.
9 See Sect. 1, one may believe that visual attention is sufficient to divide an object into parts by introducing
some ‘virtual edges’, while it is less plausible that olfactory attention can introduce an additional qualitative
component to an experience presenting a uniform odour.
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analytic—synthetic principle. Let’s assume, as interpretation (II) suggests, that if an
entity X has a proper part P, then X also has a second, complementary proper part
X-minus-P. If P and X-minus-P are simple parts, i.e., they themselves do not have any
proper parts, then the entity X is identical to the combination of P and X-minus-P. If
they are not simple, then they themselves have proper parts and their complementary
proper parts. For instance, the proper part P may have proper parts R and P-minus-R
while the proper part X-minus-P may have proper parts S and X-minus-P-minus-S.
These four proper parts may be simple and in this case the entity X is identical to the
combination of R, P-minus-R, X-minus-P, and X-minus-P-minus-S. However, if they
are not simple, then they are divided into further proper parts and their complementary
proper parts. In consequence, if X alone does not have an infinite number of proper
parts, a set of proper parts will be found, such that their combination is identical to
entity X.
Relying on the above reasoning, we may observe that if every proper part of an
entity is associated with a complementary proper part, then this entity is identical to
the combination of its proper parts, unless it has an infinite number of parts. However,
this conclusion stands in conflict with the analytic–synthetic principle, which states
that complex odours are commonly experienced as not identical to combinations of
their components. The only way to avoid this would be to state that odours can be
experienced as having an infinite number of proper parts, which is clearly false given
our limited ability to distinguish components within their structure. In consequence,
it seems that odours are not typically divided into parts, as suggested by interpretation
(II), and so this interpretation is not particularly plausible.
In contrast, interpretation (III) is completely unproblematic given the analyt-
ic–synthetic principle. According to this interpretation, when a person olfactorily
distinguishes only component C, then the odour is experienced as having some proper
parts (analytic aspect), i.e., exactly one proper part C, but is not experienced as iden-
tical to the combination of its proper parts (synthetic aspect). Hence, interpretation
(III) seems to be the most plausible in the context of human olfaction. It should be
noted that the above considerations are consistent with the claim that some situa-
tions of distinguishing only one component can be explained by interpretations (I)
or (II), because the analytic–synthetic principle describes what is common for olfac-
tory experiences, and not what is necessary for all of them. However, given the fact
that cases of distinguishing only one component happen systematically in mixtures
of various complexity and composition, it is plausible that interpretation (III) can be
properly applied to many of them. These cases constitute counter-examples to the
weak supplementation principle in the context of human olfaction.
While interpretation (III) seems to be the most plausible, one may doubt whether
the considered phenomenon of reporting only one component of an olfactory mix-
ture is really a genuinely perceptual phenomenon. It is possible that, in fact, a person
always perceives several components but is simply unable to report them in a proposi-
tional form. For instance, when a participant is presented with a lemon-lavender-honey
mixture and reports only lavender, in reality all three components are perceptually
presented, but due to some cognitive inability only one component can be reported.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that such cognitive interpretation has a strong jus-
tification. There may be two general reasons why, when several components are
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experienced, only one is reported. First, a person may lack some required cognitive
abilities. Second, the abilities may be present, but there is something in a particular
situation that prevents them from being used efficiently.
In the considered context the relevant abilities are mainly related to (a) functioning
of working memory and (b) application of concepts. To report the presence of sev-
eral components the information about these components has to be stored and easily
accessible (working memory aspect), and one needs conceptual resources in order to
recognise and name the experienced components (conceptual aspect). However, rely-
ing on results and the experimental design of the considered experiments (see initial
parts of Sect. 3), it seems that the participants have the required abilities. First, in many
cases people are able to report about four components of complex odours, which sug-
gests that the capacities of olfactory working memory are similar to those of visual
working memory (see Cowan 2000). So cases of reporting only one component cannot
be explained by postulating general limitations of memory-related abilities. Further-
more, participants of the considered experiments underwent training sessions in which
they learned to recognise relevant components. In consequence, they developed the
required concepts and gained practice in applying them to perceptual input. Never-
theless, it may still be claimed that while participants posses the required abilities,
they somehow cannot be properly used in cases when only one component is reported.
In general, there are two common causes that negatively affect the performance of
psychological mechanisms. First, time constraints may not allow the relevant mecha-
nisms to work properly. Second, there may be some distracting factors which consume
a significant amount of processing resources. However, participants in the considered
experiments had a significant amount of time to analyse the structure of presented
stimuli and they were not engaged in some additional, cognitively-demanding tasks.
If the weak supplementation principle is not satisfied in the case of odours presented
in olfactory experiences, then their component-based mereology is significantly differ-
ent from the spatial mereology of visually-experienced objects. In the final paragraphs,
I explain how these mereological differences may be grounded in differences between
vision and olfaction in their representation of space. While it seems plausible that
mereological differences are connected with differences in visual and olfactory ways
of representing space, the features of spatial representations which cause the relevant
disparities are less clear. Below, I show that rules organising visual space entails the
weak supplementation principle. However, the same is not true about olfactory space.
Visual spatial representation is very detailed (see Matthen 2004) and it seems to
satisfy the three following rules:
(I) If an object or its part is experienced, then it is experienced as spatially located.
(II) If P is experienced as a spatially located proper part of an object O, then P is
experienced as localised in a sub-region of a spatial location of O.
(III) If an object O is experienced as spatially located and having proper parts, then
O’s localisation is experienced as identical to the sum of localisations of O’s
experienced proper parts.
These rules are very intuitive in the context of human vision. First, we are not able to
visually experience unlocalised objects or their parts (rule I). Second, proper parts of
objects are always experienced as localised in sub-regions of a region occupied by the
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whole object (rule II). Finally, an object experienced as being mereologically complex
cannot be visually experienced as bigger, or smaller, than the space occupied by all
its experienced proper parts (rule III).
The joint satisfaction of rules (I)–(III) guarantees that the weak supplementation
principle is also satisfied. This principle is not satisfied if there can be an entity such
that it has a proper part P, but does not have a second proper part, disjoint from P. Let’s
assume that rule (III) is satisfied, so the visually-experienced location of a complex
object equals the sum of locations of its visually-experienced proper parts. In this
case, there are two ways in which the weak supplementation principle can be falsified.
First, an object O may be experienced as possessing only one proper part, which
has the same location as O itself. However, this possibility is blocked by rule (II),
which states that the locations of proper parts are themselves experienced as smaller
than the location of a whole. Second, the weak supplementation principle would be
false if there were an object experienced as unlocalised and as having only one—also
unlocalised—proper part. Nevertheless, this cannot be the case, due to rule (I), which
excludes visual experiences presenting such unlocalised objects.
On the other hand, while there is no agreement on how exactly to characterise
olfactory space, all positions presented in the debate suggest that olfaction represents
space in a more rudimentary way than vision. Some authors believe that olfactory
experiences present odours merely as being external to us (Baker 2016; Richardson
2013) or as positioned in a poorly defined region like “somewhere around” (Batty
2010c; Matthen 2005, p. 284). It is also argued that while humans are able to suc-
cessfully track odour sources by relying on olfactory information alone (Porter et al.
2007), this ability does not involve making spatial differentiations, but requires merely
representing differences in odours’ intensities (Keller 2016, pp. 69–70). Others claim
that olfactory spatial representation is more developed because we may experience
an odour as being extended in space (O’Callaghan 2016) and as coming from some
direction (Aasen 2018; Roberts 2015).
Such descriptions make it clear that the olfactory way of representing space allows
satisfaction of the olfactory analogue of rule (I), as every odour and every part of
an odour is experienced as localised at least in some external region. However, even
if olfaction represents some odours as spatially extended and coming from some
direction, there is no strong justification for endorsing the olfactory analogue of rule
(II). None of the proposed positions regarding olfactory space suggest that its resolution
is so detailed that a spatial location of an odour can be divided into subregions which
are localisations of proper parts of this odour (as happens in vision). In fact, when a
cherry component is distinguished within a perfume, it is not experienced as localised
in a subfragment of a perfume’s localisation. On the contrary, it seems that both an
odour and its proper part are presented as occupying the same region (like “somewhere
around” or, if directional properties are olfactorily represented, “on the left”/”on the
right”).
If the olfactory version of rule (II) is not satisfied, then the way in which space
is olfactorily represented does not entail the weak supplementation principle. This
principle may be false because the rules of spatial representation do not exclude the
possibility of odours that are experienced as having only one proper part localised in
the same location as the whole odour.
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4 Conclusions
The component-based mereological structures of olfactory experiences seem to be
different from visual spatial mereology. In the case of human olfaction, odours are pre-
sented as having mereological structure, because a relation between a complex odour
and its components can plausibly be characterised as a parthood relation. However, it
is likely, given empirical results in olfactory science, that the olfactory part-structure
does not satisfy the weak supplementation principle, as some odours are experienced
as having only one proper part. Hence, the component-based olfactory mereology is
nonclasscial and is significantly distinct from visual spatial mereology, in which the
weak supplementation principle is satisfied.
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